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Executive summary 
 
 
The Pupil Learning Credits (PLC) policy initiative was one of the reforms introduced 
to address the problems of inner city schools in England. It was introduced in 2001 
and targeted on pupils of age 11 to 14. The aim has been to provide additional 
learning opportunities for those whose social circumstances are particularly difficult.  
 
This report is one of a number of reports published as part of the PLC Evaluation and 
should be read in conjunction with the other PLC reports (see page 17). In this report, 
we present an analysis of the effect of the PLC programme on pupil attainment and 
attendance at school in the most recent year (2002-2003)  two years after it was 
introduced. We do this by comparing these outcomes in schools affected by PLCs 
relative to a comparison group, before and after the PLC policy was introduced. It is 
difficult to distinguish the effects of the PLC initiative from the effects of Excellence 
in Cities, and results have to be interpreted with this in mind.  
 
Results suggest that PLCs (or more conservatively  the combined effects of this 
policy and Excellence in Cities) had a positive impact on pupil attainment in 
Mathematics and on pupil attendance at school. Specifically, the effect has been to 
raise the percentage of pupils achieving Level 5 or above (i.e. the government target) 
at Key Stage 3 by about 2 percentage points. However, there has been no effect on 
attainment in English. With regard to pupil attendance, the effect has been to reduce 
absences by about half a day. 
 
Has the policy been worth the cost? To do an accurate Cost-Benefit Analysis, one 
would need to know how such effects translate to a range of later outcomes  for 
example, further education, wages, crime. Ideally, one would want to follow the 
children affected by these particular reforms as they progress through school and into 
the labour market.  
 
As a result of the limited information available at this time, it is only possible to do a 
very simple Cost-Benefit Analysis under strong assumptions. However, our analysis 
suggests that the policy is potentially cost-effective. Indeed, given the low per pupil 
cost of the policy, expected benefits do not have to be very large to generate a positive 
expected return.  
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1. Introduction 
 
An important aim of government policy relates to raising standards in inner city 
schools, where problems of social disadvantage are often reflected in very low 
relative measures of school performance. Excellence in Cities (EiC) was introduced 
in September 1999 and involved the distribution of funds to schools within specified 
inner city areas for particular programmes. The Pupil Learning Credits (PLC) Policy 
Initiative was introduced within a subset of these schools in September 2001. The 
latter initiative is targeted on pupils of age 11 to 14 (Key Stage 3), where the aim is to 
provide additional learning opportunities for those whose social circumstances are 
particularly difficult. Among the differences between PLCs and EiC is that in the 
former initiative more flexibility is given to schools about how the funds may be 
used1 and the target group is more narrowly defined (i.e. pupils of age 11 to 14 rather 
than the whole school). The funding per pupil is higher on average in the former 
scheme. The average funding per pupil in EiC schools is about £120 (although there is 
considerable heterogeneity between schools), whereas with regard to PLCs, it is about 
£360 for schools where over 50 per cent of students are eligible for free school meals 
and about £260 for other PLC schools.  
The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the effect of the PLC 
programme on pupil attainment and attendance at school in the most recent year 
(2002-2003)  two years after it was introduced. We do this by comparing these 
outcomes in schools affected by PLCs relative to a comparison group, before and after 
the PLC policy was introduced.  There are two main difficulties. Firstly, the PLC 
initiative was introduced to a subset of schools affected by EiC. This makes it difficult 
to distinguish the impact of the two initiatives. Secondly, PLCs were deliberately 
targeted at the most disadvantaged schools. This makes it difficult to define a suitable 
comparison group. We address these problems as far as possible by only using the 
subset of schools designated as EiC in either the first Phase (starting in September 
1999) or the second Phase (starting in September 2000); and by controlling for a rich 
set of variables. Hence, we evaluate the effect of PLC over a period in which all 
schools in the treatment group (i.e. affected by PLC policy) and the comparison 
group had been affected by EiC policy for at least a year.2  
 Results suggest that PLCs had an impact on pupil attainment on Maths 
(though not on English) and on pupil attendance at school. Given the modest costs of 
the policy, this improvement is likely to be cost-effective. This is shown in the context 
of a fairly crude Cost-Benefit Analysis. To find out the actual long-term impact of the 
programme, it will be important to commission research in the future that will 
investigate whether participants benefit later on in their school career and ultimately 
in the labour market.  
In Section 2, we explain the initiatives in a more detailed way before 
describing the data in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a descriptive analysis of 
changes between 2001 and 2003 in the treatment and comparison group schools. Then 
                                                 
1 However, as the EiC initiative has progressed, more flexibility has been given to schools about how 
available funding can be used.  
2 This does not entirely solve the problem as the impact of EiC has changed over time. See Machin et 
al. (2005). 
 5
in Section 5, we present the empirical model and results. In Section 6, we present a 
Cost-Benefit Analysis. Finally, in Section 7, we discuss conclusions.  
 
2. Policy Initiatives: Excellence in Cities and Pupil Learning Credits 
 
Excellence in Cities was introduced in over 400 schools in 1999 (EiC Phase 1) and a 
further 315 schools in 2000 (EiC Phase 2). The programme has continued to be 
extended and now covers over a third of secondary schools as well as over 1,000 
primary schools. A similar programme, Aimhigher, has also been introduced to target 
post-compulsory phases of education. The core strands of EiC are as follows: 
Learning Mentors, to help students overcome educational or behavioural problems; 
Learning Support Units, to provide short-term teaching and support programmes for 
difficult pupils; and a Gifted and Talented programme, to provide extra support for 5-
10 per cent of pupils in each school. The EiC policy also involves the designation of 
schools as Specialist and Beacon and the creation of City Learning Centres and EiC 
Action Zones.  
 The Pupil Learning Credits (PLC) Policy Initiative was implemented on a 
pilot basis from September 2001, mainly within a subset of schools designated as EiC 
in 1999 (i.e. Phase 1) and also for some schools designated as Excellence Cluster 
schools in 2001.  The latter group is not included in this analysis.3  Thus, there are 233 
PLC schools used in this analysis out of a total of about 260. While the first phase of 
EiC applied to all schools within designated Local Education Authorities (24 in total), 
schools were selected for the PLC pilot by DfES on the basis of their degree of 
disadvantage (as indicated by the percentage of students known to be eligible for Free 
School Meals). Thus, the most disadvantaged schools within Phase 1 of EiC were 
selected for the PLC pilot.  
The stated aim of the PLC initiative is to provide schools attended by 
disadvantaged students with funding to enable provision of the kind of opportunity 
that many more advantaged pupils take for granted: extra music tuition, museum and 
theatre visits, as well as extra support in the core curriculum if it is necessary (DfEE, 
2001).  Braun et al. (2003) describe the broad range of activities undertaken with PLC 
funding such as trips and residential activities, extra-curricular activities, resources for 
departments, staffing, outside specialists/visitors and prizes/awards. Hence there is 
much scope for discretion in how resources are used. The question we address is 
whether this multitude of activities had any impact in raising average pupil attainment 
or increasing attendance at school. Since PLCs are targeted on pupils of age 11 to 14, 
we focus on pupil attainment at the end of Key Stage 3. We consider attendance at 
school using a measure of school-level absences.  
 
3. Data description 
 
This analysis is based on pupil-level data sets of Key Stage 3 attainment and school-
level data. The pupil-level data set consists of a data set of all students who were in 
Year 9 in either 2003 or 2001 (i.e. the Key Stage 3 exam year)4. This data set contains 
detailed information on the students attainment at Key Stage 3, their Key Stage 2 test 
                                                 
3 The small number of PLC schools designated as EiC in 2001 (i.e. in Excellence Clusters) are 
excluded from this analysis as it would not be possible to make any attempt at distinguishing the effects 
of PLC from the effects of EiC.  
4 In this paper, school years refer to the end of the academic year, when tests take place. For example, 
2003 refers to the academic year 2002-2003. 
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results, gender, date of birth and codes for the primary and secondary schools 
attended.  School-level data consists of variables contained in the School Performance 
tables and the LEA and School Information Service (LEASIS), which have been 
matched up with the pupil-level attainment data using the school codes provided in 
both data sets.5  In this analysis, only non-special schools that are LEA maintained 
are included  thus maintained schools that exist exclusively for students with special 
needs are excluded, as are all independent schools.  
Given that PLC was implemented in a subset of EiC Phase 1 schools, we 
restrict our sample to schools in EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2. Schools in the former 
group had been affected by EiC policy for two years prior to the introduction of PLC 
whereas schools in the latter group had been in the policy for one year. Restricting our 
sample of schools in this way limits the potential for confounding the effects of PLC 
with EiC. However, it does not eliminate this risk given that there is heterogeneity 
between schools in the amount of resources available for EiC. On account of this (and 
potentially for other reasons), EiC may be more effective in some schools than in 
others, and its effectiveness may change over time.  
Our methodology involves comparing performance measures for treatment 
(subject to the PLC policy) schools with schools in two possible comparison groups. 
The first comparison group consists of all non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 and Phase 
2. The second comparison group consists of all non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1. 
Summary statistics for selected variables are shown in the Appendix (Table A.1). 
Since the PLC policy was targeted on schools within EiC Phase 1 that had a high 
percentage of students known to be eligible for Free School Meals, it is not surprising 
to see that these schools are considerably more disadvantaged (on average) than 
schools in either comparison group.6  PLC schools are also very different from 
schools in the comparison groups according to a number of other variables. For 
example, they have a higher percentage of students with Special Educational Needs 
(both statemented and non-statmented) and non-white students. It is important to 
bear this in mind when considering descriptive statistics for the outcome variables. 
 
4. Descriptive analysis 
 
In Table 1, we show summary statistics for the outcome variables of primary interest 
in each group of schools: the treatment group (i.e. schools affected by PLCs) and the 
two comparison groups: first, all non-PLC schools in areas affected by EiC Phase 1 
and Phase 2; and second, all non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1.  
 With regard to pupil attainment, we focus on the probability of attaining level 
5 or above in Maths and English respectively. There are 9 possible levels at Key Stage 
3. Level 5 is the expected standard for pupils at the end of Key Stage 3 (age 14) and 
forms the basis of government targets.7  
The first two sections of Table 1 show the percentage of students attaining 
level 5 or above within each group of schools in 2001 and 2003. For both Maths and 
English, PLC schools start from a much lower base. For example, in Maths the 
percentage of students attaining level 5 or above in 2001 is 44.24 in PLC schools 
compared to 64.45 in non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 or 2  and 69.09 in non-PLC 
                                                 
5 It was also necessary to change school codes in the various files where these had changed over the 
relevant time period. 
6 The precise qualification to become a PLC school was that in January 2000, schools in designated 
areas had to have at least 35 per cent of their pupils eligible for Free School Meals. 
7 For 2004, the targets were that 75 per cent of 14 year olds reach this level in Maths and English.  
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schools in EiC Phase 1. For both English and Maths, the increase over time is higher 
within PLC schools than in either of the two comparison groups. For PLC schools, the 
change over time in English and Maths attainment is 5.09 and 8 percentage points 
respectively, whereas the corresponding change in non-PLC schools (in Phase 1 or 2 
areas) is 3.83 and 4.8 percentage points. Hence the difference in difference estimate 
(i.e. the change over time in PLC schools as compared to non-PLC schools) is about 
1.26 percentage points for English (i.e. 5.09-3.83) and 3.2 percentage points for Maths 
(i.e. 8-4.8). 
The second two sections of Table 2 show the percentage of half days missed 
for the different groups of schools.8  Similarly to the attainment outcomes, PLC 
schools have a different starting point, with a higher percentage of absences in 2001. 
On average, the percentage of half days missed in PLC schools is 11.89. The 
corresponding figure in non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 and 2 is 9.57, whereas it is 
8.73 in non-PLC schools within EiC Phase 1. The reduction in absences between 
2001 and 2003 is higher in PLC schools at 1.77 per cent compared to the reduction in 
the other comparison groups (.94 and .77 per cent respectively). Hence the difference 
in difference estimate is -.83 percentage points (i.e. -1.77  [-.94]) when PLC schools 
are compared to non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 areas and -1 percentage 
point (i.e. -1.77  [-.77]) when compared to non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 areas. 
Thus, the reduction in school absences is about 1 percentage point higher in schools 
that were exposed to the PLC policy over this time period.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Key Stage 3 Attainment and Absences 
 Treatment 
Group: 
PLC schools 
Non-PLC 
schools in EiC 
Phase 1 or 
Phase2 
Non-PLC 
schools in EiC   
Phase 1 
KS3 Maths:  
Percentage attaining Level 5 
2001 44.24 64.45 69.09 
2003 52.24 69.25 73.61 
Change, 2001 to 2003 8 4.8 4.52 
Number of pupils 80181 185407 73212 
Number of schools 233 491 191 
KS3 English: 
Percentage attaining Level 5 
2001 46.07 64.72 69.63 
2003 51.52 68.55 74.14 
Change, 2001 to 2003 5.45 3.83 4.51 
Number of pupils 80086 92827 73178 
Number of schools 233 491 191 
Absences: Percentage Half 
Days Missed in School 
2001 11.89 9.57 8.73 
2003 10.12 8.63 7.96 
Change, 2001 to 2003 -1.77 -.94 -.77 
Number of Schools 233 491 191 
Notes: KS3 levels calculated from pupil-level administrative data on Key Stage 3 test results; 
absences calculated from school-level data from the Secondary School Performance Tables.  
 
 
                                                 
8 It has been pointed out that policy has changed in relation to absences, which may have an impact on 
recorded absences. As long as this uniformly affects PLC and non-PLC schools, this will have no effect 
on results reported in this analysis.  
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However, given the very different characteristics of PLC schools compared to 
schools in the comparison groups, one cannot attribute the relative improvement in 
PLC schools to the effects of the PLC policy. To establish the causal role of the PLC 
policy, we need to apply our empirical model. 
 
5. Empirical Model 
 
Modelling Approach 
The aim of our modelling approach is to identify the effect of PLC policy on pupil-
level and school-level outcomes while taking account of other factors that may be 
related to the outcome measures  in particular if such factors are also correlated with 
being observed as a PLC school. A simple model of pupil attainment could be 
described as follows:  
Pist = P(Xist, Zst, Tt)      (1) 
Where Zst = [PLCs, Wst] 
P denotes pupil attainment of pupil i in school s at time t. This depends on variables in 
the function P(Xist, Zst, Tt), where X is a vector of individual characteristics such as 
prior attainment; Z is a vector of school characteristics; and T represents year effects. 
School characteristics consist of a variable denoting whether or not a school is PLC 
and a vector of other variables W, which includes the percentage of pupils eligible for 
Free School Meals in a school; pupil numbers; the percentage of students with Special 
Educational Needs and a range of other relevant factors that may influence pupil 
attainment.  
A version of this model which might be estimated is as follows:  
Pist = α0 + γPLCs + λWst + ηXist + ψTt+ εist        (2) 
Where γ, the coefficient on PLC, is of main interest since this measures the 
relationship between being a PLC school and pupil attainment. However, it seems 
likely that whether or not a school is PLC is correlated with other variables that also 
affect pupil attainment. For example, we noted that PLC schools have very different 
observable characteristics (such as eligibility for Free School Meals) than schools in 
the comparison groups; and in Table 1 that the outcome measures for PLC schools are 
considerably lower that those of the comparison groups in the pre-policy period. 
Hence, as well as controlling for a range of variables (as represented by X, W and T), 
it may be important to control for whether or not the school was a PLC school in the 
pre-policy period9, or even more stringently, to include a dummy variable for each 
secondary school in the data. The latter approach controls for any school-specific 
factors (whether or not they are observable) that may influence pupil attainment. 
However, if we want to pursue either of these options, then estimation of equation (2) 
will not reveal the effect of the PLC policy. To estimate the effect of PLC policy on 
pupil attainment in this context requires data from more than one time period and 
from periods where schools change PLC status. In this case, equation (2) can be 
rewritten either as (3a) or (3b)  
                                                 
9 Controlling for whether the school is defined as PLC in the pre-policy period means controlling for 
permanent differences between PLC and non-PLC schools  the fact that there are permanent 
differences between the two groups is very evident in Table 2, where it is clear that outcomes differ 
substantially in the pre-policy period as well as in the post-policy period. 
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Pist = α0 + βPLCsTt=2003 +  γPLCs + λWst + ηXist + ψTt+ εist         (3a)  
Pist = α0 +αs +  βPLCsTt=2003 + λWst + ηXist + ψTt+ εist         (3b) 
Where PLCsTt=2003  is an interaction term, which is equal to one if the school is a PLC 
school and the year is 2003 (i.e the time period in which PLC policy was in effect). 
This allows us to identify the effect of PLC policy while also taking account of 
whether the school was a PLC school in the pre-policy period (i.e PLCs  in equation 
3a) or controlling for secondary school dummies (or school fixed effects, as denoted 
by αs  in equation 3b).10 Thus β is the coefficient of interest. It captures shifts in 
pupil attainment within treatment schools vis-à-vis comparison group schools that 
occur after the policy is introduced.  
 The analysis for absences is the same as that outlined above except that it is at 
school-level, as pupil-level information on absences is not collected nationally. 
 
Results: pupil attainment 
 
We present statistical estimates of the impact of PLCs for Maths in Table 2. 
This consists of two panels, each of which focuses on a different comparison group: 
in the upper panel, the comparison group is all non-PLC schools in areas affected by 
EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2; in the lower panel the comparison group is all non-PLC 
schools within EiC Phase 1 areas. Each panel has three specifications, starting with a 
simple specification in column (1) that only includes controls for whether the school 
is PLC, a year dummy and an interaction term between this year dummy and 
whether the school is in PLC (which allows us to identify the policy effect). In 
column (2), we include a very rich set of school-level controls as well as the pupils 
gender and prior attainment at Key Stage 2. A list of the included variables can be 
found in the notes to Table 2. Then in column (3), we also include school fixed 
effects, as well as this very long list of controls. This detailed specification is reported 
for boys and girls separately in columns (4) and (5).  
The simplest specification (column 1) shows a positive impact of the PLC 
initiative (i.e. the interaction term between PLC and Year=2003). This is just another 
way of showing the descriptive results reported in Table 1 and shows the probability 
of attaining level 5 or above in Maths to be .032 (or 3.2 percentage points) higher in 
PLC schools compared to non-PLC schools as a result of the policy.11 When controls 
are added, the magnitude of the effect reduces to .021 (or 2.1 percentage points). The 
effect is about the same for boys and girls. The effects are the same whether we use 
the larger comparison group (i.e. non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 areas) 
or the smaller one (i.e. non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 areas). The results can be 
interpreted as showing that PLC increases the number of pupils that attain level 5 or 
above by 2.1 percentage points.  
 An analogous structure is presented for English in the Appendix (Table A.2). 
However, in this case, the small differential between PLC and non-PLC schools in the 
                                                 
10 In regressions where school fixed effects are controlled for, γ is not estimated as whether or not the 
school is PLC is incorporated within αs. 
11 However, we cannot completely separate out the effect of EiC Phase 1 and PLC, given that PLC was 
introduced to the most disadvantaged schools in EiC Phase 1; and the effects of EiC policy are stronger 
for more disadvantaged schools and change over time (as reported in Machin et al., 2005). The effects 
here are more accurately interpreted as reflecting the combined impact of EiC and PLC.  
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simple specification disappears completely once controls are added to the regression. 
There appears to be no effect of the PLC policy on this measure of attainment. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Maths Key Stage 3 – Probability of Attaining Level 5 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools  
 (1) Only 
PLC, EiC  
& year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables 
(3) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables & 
KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(4) As 
column (3) 
Boys only 
(5) As 
column (3) 
Girls only 
PLC *Year=2003 .032 (.006) .021 (.005) .021 (.005) .021 (.006) .022 (.006) 
PLC -.202 (.010) -.011 (.006) -- -- -- 
Sample size 265588 265588 265588 133192 132291 
Number of schools 724 724 724 649 670 
R-squared .03 .54 .55 .55 .55 
 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 schools  
 (1) Only 
PLC, EiC  
& year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables 
(3) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables & 
KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(4) As 
column (3) 
Boys only 
(5) As 
column (3) 
Girls only 
PLC *Year=2003 .035 (.007) .020 (.006) .021 (.006) .022 (.007) .019 (.007) 
PLC -.248 (.012) .001 (.008) -- -- -- 
Sample size 153393 153393 153393 76532 76777 
Number of schools 424 424 424 362 379 
R-squared .06 .54 .52 .53 .52 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on secondary schools). All specifications 
include gender, prior attainment at age 11, a year dummy, school fixed effects and a range of variables 
relevant to the pupils secondary school and primary school: number of pupils; pupil-teacher ratio; 
percentage of pupils with Special Educational Needs (with/without statement); percentage of pupils 
eligible for Free School Meals; percentage of non-white pupils; average performance of primary school 
(in terms of absences; attainment) at the time when it was attended by the pupil; average performance 
of secondary school  in the pre-policy period (in terms of absences; attainment) dummies for the 
following: all boys school; all girls school; religious school; sixth form (secondary); grammar school 
(secondary); modern school (secondary); primary school type (infant; independent; special; other); 
missing value dummies;  
 
  
It may be thought that the PLC policy would only have an effect around the 
government target of level 5. Possibly resources might be concentrated on those 
pupils most likely to move over this particular threshold and hence results reported 
above would give a misleading impression of the educational effect of the policy. In 
Table 3, we show the effect of PLC policy (i.e. the coefficient on PLC*Year=2003) 
for other measures of the dependent variable using the most detailed specification (i.e. 
as in column 3 above) for all students and then for boys and girls separately.  
 The results in Table 3 show a slightly smaller effect of the PLC policy on the 
probability of attaining level 4 or above in Maths. The estimated effect of PLC policy 
is about 1.4-1.5 percentage points. However, this is fairly close in magnitude to that 
considered above in Table 2 and suggests that the policy is not only moving students 
from levels 4 to 5. However, once again, there is no effect for English. Effects of PLC 
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on the average level are also shown. This amounts to treating the level (on a scale of 
0-8) as a continuous variable.12 This involves a strong assumption as it treats a move 
between each successive category as equivalent. However, using this measure, the 
effect of .067 and .064 for Maths can be interpreted in the following way: the PLC 
policy led to an increase in attainment of between .064 and .067 levels; or it increased 
the number of students moving up a level in PLC schools by between 6.4 and 6.7 
percentage points. One can also interpret this coefficient in terms of standard 
deviations (unlike when using the discrete measures). In this case, the effect of PLC 
policy may be interpreted as generating an increase in attainment of between .036 and 
.038 standard deviations.13  There is no statistically significant effect of PLC policy 
on the average level attained in English. We use these results for the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, which is described in Section 6.  
 
 
Table 3: Effects of PLC on Various Measures of Attainment 
 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools  
 
 
Dependent variable 
(1) Includes KS2, 
gender & all school 
variables & KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(2) As column 
(1) 
Boys only 
(3) As column 
(1) 
Girls only 
KS3 Maths Level 4 or above .014 (.004) .012 (.005) .015 (.005) 
KS3 Maths average level .067 (.018) .051 (.022) .083 (.022) 
KS3 English Level 4 or above .003 (.007) .007 (.010) -.001 (.007) 
KS3 English average level .036 (.030) .039 (.035) .033 (.033) 
 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 schools  
 
 
Dependent variable 
(1) Includes KS2, 
gender & all school 
variables & KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(2) As column 
(1) 
Boys only 
(3) As column 
(1) 
Girls only 
KS3 Maths Level 4 or above .015 (.005) .013 (.006) .017 (.006) 
KS3 Maths average level .064 (.022) .046 (.028) .081 (.025) 
KS3 English Level 4 or above -.001 (.008) .002 (.011) -.004 (.007) 
KS3 English average level .005 (.037) .013 (.043) -.002 (.042) 
Notes: as for table 2. Coefficient reported on PLC*Year=2003.  
 
 Finally, schools are allocated a different amount of pupil expenditure 
depending on the percentage of children in the school known to be eligible for Free 
School Meals. There are two categories. Schools with over 50% of pupils known to be 
eligible for Free School Meals obtain about £360 per pupil, whereas other PLC 
schools obtain about £240 per pupil. Hence, it is of interest to consider the effect of 
PLC according to whether the school is receiving the larger or smaller per pupil 
expenditure. However, it is difficult to say whether heterogeneity in the effect of the 
policy is due to the effect of the higher expenditure or the effect of a given amount of 
expenditure on schools with different characteristics.  
                                                 
12 B - Below Level and N  not entered are treated as level 1 whereas A  absent and D  
disapplied are treated as level 0.  This is in line with DfES practice of not treating such observations as 
missing.  Treating all these codes as level 1 does not effect the results greatly. Coefficients reduce from 
.067 to .059 and .064 to .055. 
13 This is computed by dividing the coefficients of .064 and .067 respectively by the standard deviation 
of the outcome variable (1.77 and 1.76 in the two samples). 
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 Results are reported in Table 4 where the dependent variable considered is 
whether the student attains level 5 or above in Maths. PLC*High represents PLC 
schools with over 50 per cent of students known to be eligible for FSM and therefore 
eligible for the higher per-pupil PLC expenditure. PLC*Low represents other PLC 
schools (which all have at least 35 per cent of students eligible for FSM). The two 
coefficients of interest are PLC*High*Year=2003 and PLC*Low*Year=2003. On 
average, there is only a slightly larger impact of the PLC policy on schools within the 
high FSM/high expenditure category. However, for girls, there is a statistically 
different impact with girls in the high FSM/high expenditure category being helped 
to a greater extent by the PLC policy.  
 
 
Table 4: Maths Key Stage 3 – Probability of Attaining Level 5 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools  
 (1) Only 
PLC, EiC  
& year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables 
(3) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables & 
KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(4) As 
column (3) 
Boys only 
(5) As 
column (3) 
Girls only 
PLC*High*Year=2003 .033 (.008) .022 (.007) .023 (.007) .020 (.008) .027 (.009) 
PLC*Low*Year=2003 .030 (.007) .021 (.006) .020 (.006) .021 (.008) .019 (.007) 
PLC * High -.257 (.012) -.024 (.009) -- -- -- 
PLC * Low -.167 (.012) -.009 (.006)    
Sample size 265588 265588 265588 133192 132291 
Number of schools 724 724 724 649 670 
R-squared .04 .54 .55 .55 .55 
 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 schools  
 (1) Only 
PLC, EiC  
& year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, 
gender & 
all school 
variables 
(3) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables & 
KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(4) As 
column (3) 
Boys only 
(5) As 
column (3) 
Girls only 
PLC*High*Year=2003 .036 (.009) .021 (.007) .022 (.007) .021 (.009) .024 (.010) 
PLC*Low*Year=2003 .033 (.008) .019 (.007) .020 (.007) .023 (.009) .015 (.008) 
PLC * High -.303 (.014) -.012 (.014) -- -- -- 
PLC * Low -.213 (.013) -.002 (.008)    
Sample size 153393 153393 153393 76532 76777 
Number of schools 424 424 424 362 379 
R-squared .06 .54 .54 .55 .54 
 
 
Pupil attendance at school 
 
It is also of interest to consider whether the policy had any impact on increasing pupil 
attendance at school. This is measured by data on school-level absences, which is 
collected in the School Performance Tables. In Table 5, we show results from school-
level regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage of half days missed 
due to absences.  
 As before, there are two panels corresponding to regressions using the 
alternative comparison groups. The first three columns show results from the simplest 
specification in column (1) to the most detailed in column (3), which includes school 
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fixed effects. Since the data is at school-level, regressions cannot be estimated 
separately by gender.  
 For both comparison groups, the results show a very consistent pattern: the 
reduction in absences attributable to the PLC policy becomes smaller once controls 
are added. In the most detailed specification, the magnitude of the reduction is 
between .43 and .58 of a percentage point.14 
 
 
Table 5: Absences – % half days missed 
           Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools  
 (1) Only PLC, 
EiC  & year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender & 
all school 
variables 
(3) Includes KS2, 
gender & all school 
variables & KS3 
school fixed effects 
PLC *Year=2003 -.822 (.157) -.636 (.151) -.582 (.245) 
PLC 2.32 (.26) .156 (.075) -- 
Sample size 1398 1398 1398 
Number of schools 718 718 718 
R-squared .13 .90 .95 
 
              Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 schools  
 (1) Only PLC, 
EiC  & year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender & 
all school 
variables 
(3) Includes KS2, 
gender & all school 
variables & KS3 
school fixed effects 
PLC *Year=2003 -1.00 (.16) -.554 (.177) -.425 (.315) 
PLC 3.169 (.288) .172 (.113) -- 
Sample size            831 831 831 
Number of schools 422 422 422 
R-squared .23 .92 .95 
 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on secondary schools). All specifications 
include school fixed effects and the average (school-level) values of the variables listed in the notes to 
table 3.  
 
 
6. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
We have seen that the impact of PLC policy was to raise attainment in Maths (though 
not in English) and to reduce absences (or equivalently, increase pupil attendance). 
This is true for those schools which had been exposed to EiC policy for the entire 
period. However, one still needs to be cautious in the interpretation of effects. Even 
schools within EiC Phase 1 will have received different amounts of expenditure as a 
result of this policy, with disadvantaged schools having received greater amounts.  
Hence it is possible that effects which are apparently attributable to the PLC policy 
are also there as a result of higher expenditure which has been allocated under the EiC 
policy. Although the PLC policy was introduced after the EiC policy, it is possible for 
policies to have a different effect over time  and in this case, a higher effect as 
                                                 
14 The magnitude of this reduction is not statistically significant in the most detailed specification when 
the comparison group is non-PLC schools in EiC Phase 1 areas. However, the sample size is quite 
small and the specification is very stringent  leading to high standard errors. The size of the 
coefficient is very close to that obtained when using the larger comparison group (which is statistically 
significant). 
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schools adapt to the policy. Thus, one might attribute the effects in the above section 
to the PLC policy, or more conservatively, to some combination of the PLC and EiC 
policies.  
 To do an accurate Cost-Benefit Analysis, one would need to know how such 
effects translate to a range of later outcomes  for example, further education, wages, 
crime. Ideally, one would want to follow the children affected by these particular 
policies (and comparison groups) as they progress through school and into the labour 
market. There are many difficulties. For example, due to the recent introduction of 
Key Stage tests, there is no direct estimate of the impact they have on future wages.  
 As a result of the limited information available at this time, it is only possible 
to do a very crude Cost-Benefit Analysis under strong assumptions. However, this 
gives a rough idea of whether we should think of this policy as potentially cost-
effective. Hence, we adopt the following procedure15: to quantify the benefit of the 
estimated improvement in monetary terms, we take a one level improvement to 
correspond to two years of schooling (following the national curriculum). To make 
this calculation, we use the coefficients in Table 3 (which show the effect of the PLC 
policy on the average level attained in Maths and English). Since the effect for 
English is very far from statistical significance (and the coefficient is almost zero for 
the Phase 1 comparison group), we assume that the policy had zero impact on 
attainment in English. Results for English and Maths are given equal weight.  
Benefits are thus translated into corresponding years of schooling (zero for 
English and .064x2 for Maths). The overall benefit is then multiplied by the wage 
return to an additional year of schooling (assumed to be 8 per cent) and applied to a 
measure of wages from the age of 21 to 64. We use the Family Resources Survey to 
obtain a wage profile.16 This enables an estimate of the total increase in wages due to 
the higher attainment observed in PLC schools. 
 The costs correspond to PLC spending per pupil for each of the two years that 
pupils were exposed to the policy. We approximate this as £288 per pupil per year.17  
In order to estimate the rate of return to PLC, we compare the total discounted costs 
and benefits from the start of the policy until retirement from the labour market. 
Comparing the discounted additional earnings to the discounted costs gives an 
estimated annual rate of return from investment in the policy of about 9 per cent.18 
This estimate is based on very strong assumptions and hence cannot be taken 
too seriously. However, it suggests that the PLC policy is potentially cost-effective, 
which in turn appears to be driven by the low cost of the policy. The important 
                                                 
15 The method and data is identical to that used in the economic evaluation of the Excellence in Cities 
Primary Pilot, described in Emmerson et al. (2004).  
16 Our analysis assumes that wages increase by two per cent per year in real terms. Obviously, it is 
likely that wage profiles in the future will differ from those that currently exist. This may be 
particularly true for women if employment rates continue to increase.  
17 This is based on the fact that funding per pupil is £360 in PLC schools where over 50 per cent of 
students are eligible for free school meals and £240 in other PLC schools. The latter schools constitute 
about 40 per cent of all PLC schools. (360x.4) + (240x.6)=288 
18  The rate of return of the policy (R) equalises the discounted total cost to the discounted total 
benefit. Denoting the cost per pupil in year t as Ct, the average increase in levels as λ, the return in 
terms of wages of an extra years education as r and expected wages in a given year by wt, R 
solves:  
∑ ∑
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 For more details see Krueger and Whitmore (1999). 
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question for future research is whether the educational benefits identified in this 
research are meaningful and genuinely translate into higher educational attainment in 
the future and subsequently into the labour market. Another important question is the 
consequence of higher pupil attendance at school in terms of current and future 
outcomes.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents an analysis of the of the Pupil Learning Credits (PLC) Policy 
Initiative two years after its introduction. This is one of a range of initiatives which 
has been targeted on schools in disadvantaged areas, and was introduced within a 
subset of schools that were already part of another such initiative, Excellence in Cities 
(EiC). We try to identify the effect of PLC policy by comparing outcomes in PLC 
schools and non-PLC schools in these areas, before and after the PLC policy was 
introduced. Results suggest that PLC had a positive effect on pupil attainment in 
Maths at Key Stage 3  for example, increasing the probability of achieving the 
expected standard (level 5+) by about 2 percentage points.  It also raised pupil 
attendance. To ascertain the educational value of this improvement, together with 
longer-term outcomes, one would want to follow these students over time (as well as 
those in the comparison group schools). However, educational and labour market 
gains only need to be modest to generate benefits in excess of the costs of this policy.  
As with Excellence in Cities, the per-pupil costs of the programme are quite low. As 
demonstrated by the crude Cost-Benefit Analysis in this report, the programme is 
likely to be cost-effective. Hence, providing more resources to disadvantaged schools 
really does make a difference in terms of raising pupil attainment and can be 
extremely cost-effective.  
 16
References 
 
Braun, Annette, Anne West and Paula Smith (2003) Evaluation of the Pupil Learning 
Credits Pilot Scheme, Interim report produced for Department for Education 
and Skills, September 2003. 
 
Department for Education and Employment (2001), Schools: Building on Success,  
 The Stationary Office. 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/buildingonsuccess/pdf/schools.pdf 
 
Emmerson, Carl, Christine Frayne, Sandra McNally and Panu Pelkonen (2004),  
Economic Evaluation of Excellence in Primary Schools. Report to the 
Department for Education and Skills, Final Report: October 2004. 
 
Kruger, Alan and Diane Whitmore, (1999), The Effect of Attending a Small Class in  
the Early Grades on College-Test Taking and Middle School Test Results: 
Evidence from Project STAR, Princeton University, Industrial Relations 
Section Working Paper No. 427 [online].  
Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=223492 
 
Machin, Stephen, Sandra McNally and Costas Meghir (2003) Excellence in Cities: 
Evaluation of an Education Policy in Disadvantaged Areas, report produced 
for Department for Education and Skills, March 2003. 
http://www.nfer.ac.uk/research/documents/EIC/CEPIF.doc 
 
Machin, Stephen, Sandra McNally, and Costas Meghir, (2005), Excellence in Cities: 
Evaluation of an Education Policy in Disadvantaged Areas, Report to the 
Department for Education and Skills. November 2005.  
 
 
 17
Related reports 
 
Braun, Annette, Philip Noden, Anne West, and Audrey Hind (2005), Evaluation of 
the Pupil Learning Credits Pilot Scheme: Analysis of Pupils Progress and 
Pupil Survey Responses 2003, Department for Education and Skills, Research 
Report RR686, November 2005 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/RR686.pdf 
 
Braun, Annette, Philip Noden, Audrey Hind, Sandra McNally, and Anne West (2005), 
Final Report of the Evaluation of the Pupil Learning Credits Pilot Scheme, 
Department for Education and Skills, Research Report RR687, November 
2005 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/RR687.pdf 
 
Kendall, Lesley, Sarah Golden, Stephen Machin, Sandra McNally, Costas Meghir, 
Marian Morris, Philip Noden, Lisa ODonnell, Kate Ridley, Simon Rutt, Ian 
Schagen, Sheila Stoney and Anne West, (2005), Excellence in Cities: the 
National Evaluation of a Policy to Raise Standards in Urban Schools 2000 to 
2003, Department for Education and Skills, Research Report RR675A, 
November 2005 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/RR675A.pdf 
 
Machin, Stephen, Sandra McNally, and Costas Meghir, (2005), Excellence in Cities: 
Evaluation of an Education Policy in Disadvantaged Areas, Report to the 
Department for Education and Skills. November 2005.  
 
 
 
 
924120004 - Excellence in Cities: The National Evaluation of a Policy to Raise Stand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
Acknowledgements 
 
The methodology in this report is used by Machin et al. (2003) to evaluate the effect 
of Excellence in Cities and this research draws on the work to evaluate EiC. Also, the 
author is grateful to Steve Machin for helpful advice on this report and to Lesley 
Kendall and Anne West for useful comments. Thanks to Panu Pelkonen for excellent 
research assistance. 
 
 
 19
 
Appendix  
 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
 
 PLC Schools Non-PLC schools 
in EiC Phase 1 or 
Phase 2 
 
Non-PLC schools in 
EiC Phase 1  
Number of schools 233 484 190 
Pupil-teacher ratio 15.84 16.70 16.83 
Number of pupils 925 1045 1094 
Percentage of SEN students, with statement 3 2 2 
Percentage of SEN students, no statement 26 17 15 
Percentage of FSM students  48.26 22.96 17.79 
Religious school .22 .26 .33 
Sixth form .42 .51 .68 
Percentage of non-white students 49 16                20 
Boys school .11 .06 .10 
Girls school .18 .08 .14 
Grammar school .00 .03 .05 
Modern school .00 .01 .00 
Percentage: 5+ A-C GCSE/GNVQ grades: 2001 28 44 51 
Percentage: 5+ A-G GCSE/GNVQ grades: 2001 83 88 91 
Average GCSE/GNVQ score: 2001 29.27 36.74 40.01 
Authorised absences (% days missed) 9.24 8.15 7.45 
Unauthorised absences (% days missed) 2.59 1.25 1.09 
 
 
Notes: means of selected variables by group of schools, based on 2001 values. Variables are derived 
from the Secondary School Performance Table and the LEA and School Information System. 
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Table A.2: English Key Stage 3 – Probability of Attaining Level 5 
 
 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools  
 (1) Only 
PLC, EiC  
& year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables 
(3) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables & 
KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(4) As 
column (3) 
Boys only 
(5) As 
column (3) 
Girls only 
PLC *Year=2003 .013 (.010) .005 (.010) .005 (.010) .006 (.011) .004 (.011) 
PLC -.186 (.013) -.008 (.010) -- -- -- 
Sample size 265392 265392 265392 133165 132135 
Number of schools 724 724 724 648 670 
R-squared .03 .46 .48 .48 .45 
 
Sample: PLC schools and all other EiC Phase 1 schools  
 (1) Only 
PLC, EiC  
& year 
variables 
(2) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables 
(3) Includes 
KS2, gender 
& all school 
variables & 
KS3 school 
fixed effects 
(4) As 
column (3) 
Boys only 
(5) As 
column (3) 
Girls only 
PLC *Year=2003 .006 (.012) -.003 (.011) -.004 (.011) -.001 (.013) -.007 (.013) 
PLC -.236 (.015) -.010 (.014) -- -- -- 
Sample size 153264 153264 153264 76519 76671 
Number of schools 424 424 424 361 379 
R-squared .06 .45 .47 .48 .45 
 
 
Notes: as for Table 2 in text. 
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